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1THE EMERGING PROTOCOL :
AN INTEGRATED RELIABLE AND EFFECTIVE REGIME
by Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando
Introduction
1.   The Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is
developing and is approaching its final form1.    It is therefore timely to examine how well the
emerging Protocol regime meets the objectives set out in the mandate2 for the Ad Hoc Group
and to compare the emerging regime and the Chemical Weapons Convention regime, which
entered into force on 29 April 1997, against an  appropriate set of criteria.
2.  As the Protocol develops, it is important to keep under review the overall effectiveness of
the regime and the extent to which it meets the objectives that States Parties had established
at the Special Conference in 1994.  The particular nature of biological weapons and their
differences from chemical weapons need to be borne in mind in carrying out such a review.
3.   This Briefing Paper examines the mandate to identify appropriate criteria against which to
evaluate the individual elements of the emerging Protocol, considers whether there are
additional criteria which need to be included and then addresses why the CWC regime is
relevant to the emerging BTWC Protocol regime before providing a comparative evaluation
of both the emerging Protocol and the existing CWC regime against these criteria.   It is
concluded that the current draft Protocol contains the essential elements for a reliable and
effective integrated regime.
The Mandate
4.   The mandate3 for the Ad Hoc Group is for it to consider appropriate measures, including
possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be
included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument..."     The heart of the Protocol is the
system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention  which under the mandate
have to meet the following requirement:
Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost-
effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the
effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse.
In addition, the mandate requires that:
Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect
sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security needs.
                                                
1Graham S Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 19 - 30 September 1994, Geneva.
3United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 19 - 30 September 1994, Geneva.
2Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any
negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial
development.
5.     From the above, a number of criteria can be identified:
Applicable to all relevant facilities and activities
Reliable
Cost-effective
Non-discriminatory
Non-intrusive as possible consistent with effective implementation
Non-abuse
to which can be added
Protection of commercial proprietary information
Protection of legitimate national security needs
Avoid negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial 
development
6.  In deciding to establish the Ad Hoc Group, the 1994 Special Conference determined to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. [Emphasis
added]   Consequently, the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group as already noted above was to
consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals
to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding
instrument.... In this context, the Ad Hoc Group shall, inter alia,  consider....   The Ad Hoc
Group has therefore rightly considered measures to improve the implementation of other
Articles of the Convention such as Article III (non-transfer) and Article IV (national
implementation).   The overall aim of the mandate is thus to not only to address compliance
measures and measures to ensure the effective implementation of Article X of the Convention
but also to improve the effectiveness of the Convention.   In other words, the cumulative
effect of the Protocol is to increase transparency, enhance confidence in compliance and to
help deter non-compliance -- and these are thus appropriate criteria to use in evaluating the
Protocol regime.   A major factor in the effectiveness of the regime is the extent to which its
is universal and this is clearly one of the reasons why measures to ensure effective and full
implementation of Article X  are specifically stated in the AHG mandate as the measures
agreed to achieve this will greatly influence and encourage the ratification and accession of
States to the Protocol.   Consequently, the promotion of the Protocol universality is another
appropriate criteria to be used in the evaluation of the Protocol regime.
7.  Finally, there is the overall objective of strengthening the norm against biological
weapons.  If the Protocol regime is indeed evaluated as being reliable and effective then the
norm against the development, production and use of biological weapons will have been
strengthened by the Protocol.   However, the converse needs to be noted.   Should the
Protocol regime be weak, ineffective and unreliable then the norm will have been brought
into disrepute -- and the barriers preventing the deliberate use of disease as a weapon of war
will have been significantly weakened.  Indeed, as was noted in the formal statement made on
29 June 1999 by State Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger of Germany on behalf of the German
Presidency of the European Union "we firmly believe that unless we can achieve decisive
progress now, we might risk stagnation or even retrogression.  I believe that, all in all, the
glass is more than half full and that we have grounds for optimism.   By adopting this
3Common Position the EU has renewed its commitment to, and expresses its firm belief in, the
success of these negotiations." [Emphasis added].  It is vital that an effective and reliable
regime be devised.
8.  The following further criteria have thus been identified:
Promotion of Protocol universality
Increased transparency
Enhanced confidence in compliance
Deter non-compliance
9.  This leads to a consolidated list of criteria:
Applicability (to all relevant facilities and activities)
Protection of CPI (commercial proprietary information)
Protection of NSN (legitimate national security needs)
Avoid negative impact (on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial
development)
Reliable
Cost-effective
Non-discriminatory
Non-intrusive (as possible consistent with effective implementation)
Non-abuse
Promotion of Protocol universality
Increased transparency
Enhanced confidence in compliance
Deter non-compliance
It will be recognised that some of these are closely related and can be combined under a
single heading.   Thus applicability and non-discriminatory are closely related and can
usefully be considered together under "Applicability".   Likewise the non-intrusive criteria is
closely related to the protection of CPI and of NSN and the avoidance of negative impact and
can be considered together under "Acceptability" which also embraces the potential burden of
the measure.
10.   This Briefing Paper evaluates the emerging Protocol regime against the following
criteria:
Applicability
Acceptability
Reliability
Cost-effectiveness
Potential for abuse
Promotion of Protocol universality
Increased transparency
Enhanced confidence in compliance
Deterrence of non-compliance
As it is widely accepted that of all the arms control regimes, the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) regime is that of the closest relevance to the emerging Protocol regime --
and both regimes include toxins -- hence the CWC regime is used as a comparative baseline
4in this evaluation.   The relevance of the CWC regime is first considered before addressing
the nature of the two regimes and then evaluating them against the above criteria.
The Relevance of the CWC Regime
11.   Although there is general acceptance that the CWC regime is that of closest relevance to
the emerging BTWC Protocol regime, it has been suggested by some that the BTWC is
orders of magnitude more difficult to monitor than nuclear, chemical or conventional arms
control accords.4  However, biological weapons are most closely related to chemical weapons
because both involve the attack primarily of human beings through the inhalation of material
and consequently, the delivery means used for biological and chemical weapons are similar
even though the quantities needed for a biological weapons attack is significantly smaller than
for a chemical weapons attack.   The view that there are orders of magnitude difference
between the task facing those monitoring the strengthened BTWC Protocol and the CWC
suggests that the dual-use problem in regard to biotechnology is different in kind from that in
regard to chemical technology.   More detailed analysis shows that this generalization is
incorrect.5
12.  In reality, the problem of verification of the BTWC is directly analogous to that of the
CWC.   Although the CWC does list chemicals in Schedules and links the strictness of
monitoring to the Schedules, there are many chemicals that could be used as chemical
weapons that are not listed on the Schedules6.   This is particularly true if assumptions such as
the need for stability and a reasonable storage life are dropped.   The CWC7 in Article VI. 2
requires each State Party to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and
their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred or
used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.   Only in regard to the chemicals listed in the schedules of
the CWC Annex on Chemicals does the CWC go on to specify how this is to be
implemented.  As was pointed out in Briefing Paper No 118, it is left for individual States-
Parties to decide what the Ònecessary measuresÓ should be for the huge multitude of
unscheduled chemicals (including toxins and other toxic biotechnological-process products)
also subject to the Art VI.2 provision in accordance with what has come to be called its
Ôgeneral purpose criterionÕ.
                                                
4Amy E. Smithson, Tall Order:  Crafting a meaningful Verification Protocol for the Biological Weapons
Convention, Politics and Life Sciences, March 1999, in press.
5Jonathan B. Tucker, Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and their Relevance to the
Biological Weapons Convention, in Biological Weapons Proliferation:  Reasons for Concern, Course for
Action, ed. Amy E. Smithson, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 24, January 1998.
6Graham S. Pearson, Chemical and Biological Defence:  An Essential Security Requirement, Proceedings 8th
International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, Sweden,
11 - 16 June 1995, p. 14
7United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.htm
8J P Perry Robinson, The CWC Verification Regime:  Implications for the Biotechnological & Pharmaceutical
Industry, Briefing Paper No. 11, University of Bradford, July 1998.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk
/acad/sbtwc
513.  As the CWC Annex on Chemicals9 states in the first paragraph of Section B For the
purpose of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the
application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex.
Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of
chemical weapons. [Emphasis added].   It is thus clear that the lists of chemicals in the CWC
Schedules are not, and cannot be, comprehensive lists -- and the parallel will be equally true
of any lists of biological agents and toxins in the emerging BTWC Protocol.   It has therefore
to be appreciated that in both the CWC and the BTWC Protocol regimes, other toxic or
infectious materials, produced in a facility that is not within the scope of the required
declarations, may be utilized in a breach of the regime.   Verification, confidence and trust
does not come about in the CWC regime because all relevant items are monitored -- and the
same will be the case under the BTWC Protocol regime.
The CWC Regime
14.   The CWC regime includes provisions for the declaration and destruction of both
chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities as well as for the data
monitoring and verification of activities not prohibited under the CWC.
15.   The central elements of the CWC10 are:
Declarations of chemical weapons, of chemical weapons production facilities (Art III)
Activities not prohibited under this Convention (Art VI)
Systematic verification through data monitoring and on-site inspection (Verification 
Annex)
Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding (Art IX)
includes Procedure for requesting clarification
  Procedures for challenge inspections
Annual information on national programmes related to protective purposes (Art X)
Economic and Technological Development (Art XI)
together with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to
implement the CWC.    For the purposes of this Briefing Paper, attention is concentrated on
the provisions for the data-monitoring and verification of activities not prohibited under the
CWC and the provisions for the declaration and destruction of chemical weapons and
chemical weapon production facilities are ignored as there is no comparable requirement in
the BTWC Protocol.   It should, however, be noted that the implementation of CWC Article
XI Economic and Technological Development   has been thus far fairly modest and the
provisions being considered for the BTWC Protocol Article VII are much broader.11 Each of
the central elements is considered in turn.
                                                
9United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.htm
10United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.htm
11Measures in CWC Article XI and the BTWC Protocol Article VII are compared in Graham S. Pearson, Article
VII Measures:  Optimizing the Benefits, Briefing Paper No. 22, University of Bradford, July 1999. Available on
http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc
6 Activities not prohibited under this Convention (Art VI)
16.   Article VI sets out the right that States Parties have, subject to the provisions of this
Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer or use toxic chemicals
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.     It requires that:
2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic
chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired,
retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its
jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this end,
and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this
Convention, each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors listed
in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilities related to such
chemicals, and other facilities as specified in the Verification Annex, that are located
on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, to verification
measures as provided in the Verification Annex.
Only in regard to the chemicals listed in the schedules of the CWC Annex on Chemicals does
the CWC go on to specify how this is to be implemented.  As was pointed out in Briefing
Paper No 1112, it is left for individual States-Parties to decide what the Ònecessary
measuresÓ should be for the huge multitude of unscheduled chemicals (including toxins and
other toxic biotechnological-process products) also subject to the Art VI.2 provision in
accordance with what has come to be called its Ôgeneral purpose criterionÕ.
17.   It is thus evident that, although the General Purpose Criterion in Article I of the
Convention is all-embracing in that:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a)To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
and chemical weapons are defined in Article II as
1. "Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes;
it is made clear in the Annex on Chemicals in the first paragraph of Section B For the
purpose of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the
application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex.
Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of
chemical weapons. [Emphasis added].
                                                
12J P Perry Robinson, The CWC Verification Regime:  Implications for the Biotechnological & Pharmaceutical
Industry, Briefing Paper No. 11, University of Bradford, July 1998. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk
/acad/sbtwc
718.  Consequently, the CWC regime in Article VI is focussed on the declaration of relevant
industrial data rather than chemical weapons data.   The principal features of this regime were
summarised in Briefing Paper No 1113 in the following table:
Table 1.  The chemical control regimes under the CWC
Elements of
control regime
For Schedule 1
chemicals
For Schedule 2
chemicals
For Schedule 3
chemicals
For
unscheduled
discrete organic
chemicals
Production
limit
No more than
1000 kg of all
types may be
held by a state-
party
None specified, but all production must be for, and in
quantities consistent with, purposes not prohibited
under the Convention
Data reporting
(initial and
annual)
Yes: detailed
information on
production, use,
import and
export
Yes: for each
one, aggregate
national data on
production, use,
import and
export
Yes: for each
one, aggregate
national data on
production,
import and
export
No, except for
plant specific
data (as with
the scheduled
chemicals)
Inspection of
facilities
producing more
than threshold
quantities
Yes: highly
stringent and
augmented with
instrumented
monitoring
Yes Yes: less
stringent
Not until EIF+3
yrs, if then
approved by the
Conference of
the States
Parties
Export control Exports
permitted only
to states parties,
with advance
notification of
OPCW
End-use
certification
required until
EIF+3 yrs, after
which exports
permitted only
to states parties
End-use
certification
required; and
possibility of
other measures
after EIF+ 5 yrs
None specified
19.   Briefing Paper No 11 then goes on to address the mandatory declarations, routine
inspections and challenge inspection provisions of the CWC which together comprise the
                                                
13J P Perry Robinson, The CWC Verification Regime:  Implications for the Biotechnological & Pharmaceutical
Industry, Briefing Paper No. 11, University of Bradford, July 1998. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk
/acad/sbtwc
8central elements of the ongoing monitoring and verification regime.   These are summarised
here for ease of reference reproducing material and language from Briefing Paper No 1114.
20.  Mandatory Declarations.  For purposes of the Article VI declarations, the CWC Annex
on Chemicals sets out three schedules, which together list 43 species or families of chemical:
12 in Schedule 1 (including saxitoxin and ricin, as well as blister and nerve gases and
intermediates thereof), 14 in Schedule 2, and 17 in Schedule 3 (including hydrogen cyanide,
which as a toxic agent of biological origin is a toxin within the meaning of the Biological
Weapons Convention).  Of the 43, 27 are precursors and 16 are toxicants.  Each of the
chemicals has been scheduled because it is deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of
the Convention, the chemicals in Schedule 1 a ÒhighÓ  risk, and those in Schedule 2 a
ÒsignificantÓ  risk.  The scheduling also reflects the degree of industrial application of the
listed chemicals, those in Schedule 3 being ones Òproduced in large commercial quantitiesÓ
and those in Schedule 1 Òhaving little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this
ConventionÓ.  The three schedules are in fact negotiated lists, though criteria for adding new
chemicals to them, or removing existing ones, are also specified in the Annex on Chemicals.
Two categories of declaration are triggered by each schedule, one having to do with the
chemicals per se, the other with facilities associated with them.  The amount of detail
required is greatest for Schedule 1 and smallest for Schedule 3, this reflecting the differing
stringency of the control regime associated with each schedule.  The facilities to be declared
are ones in which more than threshold quantities of the chemicals are produced or, for
chemicals on Schedules 1 and 2, processed or consumed.  The facility declarations also
extend, with certain exemptions, to plant sites where Òunscheduled discrete organic
chemicalsÓ  are Òproduced by synthesisÓ  in more than threshold quantities.  Annual
declarations are made in two broad types, one reporting data for the previous year, the other
reporting anticipated data for the year ahead.  A summary of all these declaration
requirements is given in Table 2.
Table 2.  Chemical industry declarations required of CWC States-Parties
CWC element Information to be declared by each State Party Deadline
VerAx VII.9-10
VerAx VIII.9-
10
Each plant site where there is plant that has
produced Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals for chemical-
weapons purposes at any time since 1 January
1946
By entry into force
(EIF) + 30 days
VerAx VI.17-
20
Location and details of all facilities approved for
production of more than 0.1 kg/yr of Schedule 1
chemicals for research, medical or pharmaceutical
purposes.
Annual declarations also required: of prior-year
production, consumption, storage and transfer, and
of projected next-year production.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
& year-start - 90 d
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Industry, Briefing Paper No. 11, University of Bradford, July 1998. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk
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9CWC element Information to be declared by each State Party Deadline
VerAx VII.1-2 Aggregate national data on the production,
processing, consumption, import and export of
Schedule 2 chemicals, for each such chemical
during the previous calendar year.
Declaration to be repeated annually.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
VerAx VIII.1-2 Aggregate national data on the production, import
and export of Schedule 3 chemicals, for each such
chemical
Declaration to be repeated annually.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
VerAx VII.3-8 Each plant site where Schedule 2 chemicals have
recently been, or will next year be, produced,
processed or consumed in amounts exceeding 1
ton/yr (or less for three of the chemicals: see Table
3), with details.
Annual declarations also required, both of prior-
year and of projected next-year activities.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
& year-start - 60 d
VerAx VIII.3-8 Each plant site where Schedule 3 chemicals have
been or will be produced in amounts exceeding 30
ton/yr, with details.
Annual declarations also required, both of prior-
year and of projected next-year activities.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
& year-start - 60 d
VerAx IX.1-6 For unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, each
plant site where more than 200 tons were
synthesized during the previous year, unless the
chemicals contain P, S or F, in which case the
threshold is 30 tons, or unless the chemicals are
exclusively explosives or hydrocarbons.
The list of sites is to be updated annually.
By EIF + 30 days
By yr-start + 90 d
21.  Routine Inspections.   If the annual quantity of scheduled chemical processed,
consumed and/or produced in a declared facility exceeds a specified threshold, the facility
becomes liable to routine inspection by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.  It is not obvious, in
10
retrospect, that this simple quantitative method for triggering the international inspectorate
into action within civil industry is really the best way of ensuring that all industrial 'dual use'
facilities that are especially vulnerable to abuse are brought within the ambit of routine
inspection.  As set out in the treaty, the trigger is clearly a compromise.  The key thing about
it is that it is the outcome of international negotiation in which senior representatives of
chemical industry, as well as diplomats and chemical-weapons experts, were involved
throughout.  Important for industry representatives was the willingness of the diplomats first
to write into the treaty stringent provisions for safeguarding confidential proprietary
information, secondly to accept that the number of routine inspections a State-Party would be
required to receive at declared industrial facilities each year would be rather tightly limited,
and thirdly to accept that each and every routine inspection could be governed by a  Òfacility
agreementÓ  that had been negotiated bilaterally between the OPCW Technical Secretariat
and the State-Party concerned.  These facility agreements limit access by OPCW inspectors
solely to those particular areas of a plant site that had been declared as producing, or
otherwise handling, a scheduled chemical; the facility agreements preclude access to other
areas.  Within those parameters, the intrusiveness of routine inspection varies from schedule
to schedule.  A summary of the facility control regime is given in Table 3 -- in which CWSF
is the abbreviation for Chemical Weapons Storage Facility, CWPF for Chemical Weapons
Production Facility, CWDF for Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, and UDOC for
Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals.  The key points to note are that routine industry
inspections under the CWC are carried out relatively infrequently (perhaps once every three
years at a particular facility), and that they are tightly circumscribed inspections that are
confined to declared areas of plant sites.
Table 3.  The Facility Control Regimes under the CWC
Facility
type
Number of
inspectable
facilities
anticipated
by OPCW
PrepCom
Routine inspection regime
Facilit
y
agree
ment
Annual
production
threshold
Contin
uous
monito
ring
Notice
of
inspect
ion
Durati
on of
inspect
ion
Access
during
inspect
ion
Frequency
of
inspection
for reporting f
o
r
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
CWSF 33 (and 40
for OACW)
Manda
tory
[not applicable] On-site
instrum
ents
initial:
72 hrs
other:
48 hrs
As
agreed
Autom
atic to
declare
d
faciliti
es
Not
specified in
the CWC
CWPF 43 Manda
tory
[not applicable] On-site
instrum
ents
initial:
72 hrs
other:
24 hrs
As
agreed
Autom
atic to
declare
d CW
Upto 4 per
year
CWDF 4 Manda
tory
[not applicable] On-site
instrum
ents
and
inspect
ors
As
agreed
Autom
atic to
all
parts
of
declare
d
faciliti
es
Not
specified in
the CWC
Schedule
1 facilities
ca 75 Manda
tory
0.01 kg 0
.
0
1
k
g
On-site
instrum
ents
As
agreed
Autom
atic to
declare
d
faciliti
es
Not
specified in
the CWC
Facility
type
Number
of
inspecta
ble
facilities
anticipat
ed by
OPCW
PrepCo
m
Routine inspection regime
Facility
agreeme
nt
Annual
production
threshold
Continuou
s
monitorin
g
Notice of
inspectio
n
Duration
of
inspection
Access
during
inspection
Frequency
of
inspection
for
repor
ting
for
ins
pe
cti
on
Schedule
2
facilities
More
than 300
Mandato
ry unless
waived
by both
sides
BZ:
amito
n:
PFIB:
Other
s:
10
kg
1 t
1 t
10
t
No 48 hrs 96 hrs Automatic
to plant
site and to
specified
areas
within
declared
plants;
beyond
that, as
agreed
Upto 2 per
year per
plant site
Schedule
3
facilities
ca 400 Optional 30 t 20
0 t
No 120 hrs 24 hrs Upto 2 per
year per
plant site,
with limit
on
combined
total
UDOC
facilities
More
than
5000
Optional PSF:
30 t
Other
s:
200t
20
0 t
20
0 t
No 120 hrs 24 hrs Automatic
to plant
site;
managed,
to
declared
plants
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22.  Challenge Inspections.  Routine inspections are not meant to discourage production of
chemical weapons or other illicit activities in undeclared facilities, nor can they be expected
to deter abuse of declared facilities, such as could conceivably happen if cheaters were to find
ways of evading the procedures prescribed for the routine verification regime.  Moreover,
routine inspections do not allow States Parties much opportunity to demonstrate that
particular facilities within their jurisdiction are not being abused.  The challenge inspection
provisions of the CWC are intended to serve the first two of these functions.  They could also
contribute to the third.  A State-Party wishing to dispel doubts or allegations concerning its
own compliance may, under CWC Art IX.5, seek the assistance of the Executive Council to
clarify the situation.  It is up to the Council to decide what to do, but among its options will
be that of organizing a special inspection by the Technical Secretariat.  No challenge
inspections have yet been conducted under the CWC.  A number of States-Parties have,
however, invited the participation of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in practice challenge
inspections.
23.  Challenge inspection represents the CWC verification regime at its most intrusive.  Like
the civil-industry controls, it is a precedent-setting feature of the treaty.  Walter Krutzsch and
Ralf Trapp15 describe how, in the intrusiveness of challenge inspection and in the essentially
unlimited range of sites at which it may be applied, it far surpasses such procedures as the
'unannounced inspections' of the IAEA safeguards system, the CSCE inspections, the 'short
notice inspections' of the INF treaty and the 'inspections on suspicion' of the CFE treaty.  In
the limitations placed by the Convention on challenge inspection are to be seen the most
delicate of the compromises reached by the original negotiators: a balance between, on the
one hand, the effectiveness of the central deterrent against cheating and, on the other hand,
the security of information unrelated to the Convention which, for one reason or another,
States Parties wish to keep secret.  For the BTWC Protocol regime, the key must surely lie, as
it did with the CWC, in the degree to which the routine and the challenge on-site inspection
regime can be made to support one another, thereby enhancing their overall deterrent effect.
The overall CWC Regime
 24.  It is becoming evident that the overall CWC regime is being successfully implemented.16
One of the significant benefits that has arisen has been because States Parties have made
declarations and the key parts of each State Party's declarations are available to all other
States Parties.   The Deputy Director-General of the OPCW has noted17 that this has been a
considerable confidence-building measure because it has ...enabled states-parties to see what
other states -parties have declared, and, if necessary, to seek clarification.  This process has
answered a lot of questions that were out there prior to entry into force.  Frankly, prior to
entry into force, before states-parties made their declarations, all that other countries had to
go on were press reports and intelligence estimates and so forth.  The whole process of
having declarations available to other states-parties has been a great success and a very
                                                
15Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Nijhoff, 1994,
pp.175-76
16See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report of the Organisation on the Implementation
of the Convention (29 April - 31 December 1997), Conference of States Parties, Third Session, 16 - 20
November 1998, C-III/3, 20 November 1998, and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
Report of the Organisation on the Implementation of the Convention (1 January - 31 December 1998),
Conference of States Parties, Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-IV/5, 2 July 1999.
17Arms Control Today, The CWC at the Two-Year Mark:  An Interview with Dr. John Gee,  April/May 1999,
pp. 3 - 9.
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substantial confidence-building measure.  The follow-up to declarations is thus a significant
component of the regime.
The overall CWC regime can be summarised schematically as follows:
Building  Confidence
Public Information Mandatory Declarations
Routine Visits to  
Specific Areas of 
Declared Facilities
Inconsistencies, 
Ambiguities, 
Anomalies
Information  
from 
States Parties
Addressing Concerns
Challenge Investigation Consultation, Cooperation 
 and Fact-Finding
The BTWC Protocol Regime
25.  The central elements of the emerging Protocol regime18 are:
Declarations of relevant programmes and facilities
Follow-up after submission of declarations
including randomly-selected/transparency visits
    declaration clarification procedures
    voluntary visits
Measures to ensure submission of declarations
Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
Investigations, both Field and Facility
Article VII measures to promote technical cooperation
together with an Organization to implement the Protocol.   In addition, there are various other
provisions which will all contribute to the strengthening of the Convention and the effective
implementation of the Protocol.     However, for the purposes of this Briefing Paper attention
is focussed on the central elements and their evaluation against the criteria identified above.
26.   Each of the central elements is considered in turn.
                                                
18United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46, 30 July 1999, Geneva.
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Declarations of relevant programmes and facilities
27.   The current Protocol has provisions in Article III.  D.  Declarations.  I Submission of
Declarations   for the following:
Initial Declarations
[(A)  Past Offensive and/or Defensive [Programmes][Activities]
[(B)  National Legislation and Regulations
Annual Declarations
[(C) Current Defensive [Programmes][Activities]
(D) Vaccine Production Facilities
(E) [Maximum Biological Containment][(BL-4)][Laboratories][Facilities]
(F) [High Biological Containment][(BL-3)][Laboratories][Facilities]
[(G) Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins]
[(H) Other Production Facilities]
[(I) Other Facilities]
[(J) Transfers
[(K) Declarations on the Implementation of Article X of the Convention
[Notifications]
[(L) Outbreaks of Disease]
28.  It should be recalled that the architecture of the declaration requirements is designed to
ensure that the most relevant facilities are declared and not all possible facilities.   A number
of surveys of national microbiological activities have been reported to the AHG.  The results
for Canada19, the Netherlands20, United Kingdom21, Italy22 and the five Nordic Countries23
can be summarised as follows:
Trigger used Canada Netherlands UK Italy Nordic
Military biodefence Yes Yes - Yes Yes
                                                
19Canada, Discussion Paper on Declarations:  List of Agents and Combinations of Criteria,   BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/WP. 6, 28 November 1995.
20The Netherlands, The Relevance and Effectiveness of (Combinations of) Criteria for Declaration,  BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/WP.10, 28 November 1995.
21United Kingdom, Survey of Microbiological Facilities in the UK,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 81, 23 July
1996.
22Italy, National Survey in the Microbiological Activities,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 146, 18 March 1997.
23Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Results of a Facility Declaration Trial in the Five Nordic
Countries,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 173, 18 July 1997.
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Biocontainment + other BL 4 + other BL 4 + other
Listed agents Not alone Not alone Not alone + other Yes
Genetic modification Not alone Not alone Not alone Not alone Yes
Production microbiology Yes + listed agents
+ biocontain
Not alone + listed agents + other
Aerobiology + other + listed agents
+ biocontain
- + listed agents + other
Most of the surveys give an indication of the number of facilities which would need to be
declared if certain triggers, or combinations of triggers, were to be used to capture those
facilities of most relevance to the Convention.   In these surveys, the triggers or combinations
used generally included military biodefence and BL 4 containment as stand alone triggers and
production microbiology in combination with work on listed agents as one of several
combined triggers.  The numbers to be declared if triggers such as these were to be used can
be summarised  as:
Canada Netherland
s
UK Italy Nordic
Number of facilities to be
declared
30 to 50 [Tens] - 40 50
29.  The  broad conclusion that emerges is that the number of facilities in each country that
would need to be declared under triggers chosen to capture those facilities of most relevance
to the Convention would be relatively limited with numbers of the order of 10s in each
country.   It is recalled that the Austrian/UK contribution24 to the EU seminar for the
pharmaceutical industry on 13 May 1998 said that "the number of facilities in individual EU
countries that would need to be declared can probably measured in tens rather than
hundreds."    It is clear that numbers in the 10s are being considered for most European
countries.
30.   It is also clear that no commercial proprietary information will be required for
declarations.  As was pointed out in Briefing Paper No 1825, it is also apparent from the
footnote to the title of Appendix D Information to be provided in declarations of other
facilities  in the July 1998 draft Protocol26 that neither commercial proprietary information or
national security information will be required in declarations as the footnote states:
Declared information will be passed to all States Parties to the Protocol.  Accordingly,
the design of the declaration formats is intended to avoid reference to confidential
proprietary information or national security information...
                                                
24Austria and the United Kingdom, Industry and Declarations,  UK Presidency and the European Commission:
The BWC and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 May 1998.
25Graham S Pearson, Visits: An Essential Portfolio, Briefing Paper No. 20, University of Bradford, April 1999.
Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
26United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41, 16 July 1998, Geneva.
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This exclusion of commercially sensitive information was also stated in the Austrian/UK
contribution27 to the EU seminar for the pharmaceutical industry on 13 May 1998 which said
that "All are agreed that the forms should be simple and straightforward and should not seek
any information which would be considered commercially sensitive."   Although the
Declaration Appendices have been modified and the footnote no longer appears in the current
draft Protocol, it is clear from the formats in the current draft, which are broadly similar to
those in the earlier draft which bore the footnote, that the intention to avoid reference to
commercial proprietary information or national security information remains.
Follow-up after Submission of Declarations
30.   Briefing Paper No. 2028  addressed the whole question of how to ensure that declarations
were indeed accurate and complete and concluded that there was a need for a portfolio of
visits, all of which are non-confrontational and non-accusatory, comprising basically three
types:
a.  Transparency (randomly-selected) visits
b.  Declaration clarification visits
c.  Voluntary visits -- which fall into several categories:
- (i)   assistance in compiling individual facility and national declarations
- (ii)  resolve any ambiguities related to declarations
- (iii) further the cooperation and assistance provisions of the Protocol
- (iv) to resolve a particular concern
Briefing Paper No 20 noted that the requirement for most of these apart from transparency
visits can be expected to decrease over time.  The Protocol needs to accommodate a flexible
portfolio which should realistically accommodate about 100 visits a year based on probable
size of BTWCO.
31.   The current draft Protocol in II. Follow-Up after Submission of Declarations includes
provision for the following three types of activity:
(A) Randomly-Selected/Transparency Visits
(B) Declaration Clarification Procedures and Voluntary Visit
(C) Voluntary Visits
 which can be briefly summarized as:
                                                
27Austria and the United Kingdom, Industry and Declarations, UK Presidency and the European Commission:
The BWC and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 May 1998, Brussels.
28Graham S Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, Visits: An Essential and Effective Pillar, Briefing Paper No. 18,
University of Bradford, January 1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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(A) Randomly-Selected/
 Transparency Visits
(B) Declaration
Clarification Procedures
and Voluntary Visit
(C) Voluntary Visits
Confirm declarations
consistent with obligations
Consultations (written
exchange of information or
consultative meeting)
followed, if necessary, by
visit
a. Obtain advice on
declaration obligations
b. Obtain technical assistance
c. Resolve an ambiguity...
d. Resolve a specific concern
No more than [20][50][60]
[100] per year
Mandate agreed between DG
and SP for a. and b. visits
Divided between each
category in proportion to the
total number in each category
No more than 2 per State per
year
Fairly distributed among
regional groups
No facility subject to more
than two such visits
Not more than 4 in visit team Not more than [4][5] in team
Up to 2 days duration Up to 48 hours duration
May be extended to provide
technical assistance & advice
May be extended by
agreement
32.   The overall inter-relationship of declarations and visits can be shown schematically:
DECLARATIONS  &  VISITS
Accurate  Declarations
Voluntary Visits 
    to facilities 
 to be declared
Assistance in preparing  
        Declarations
Declarations  Random Visits to Declared Facilities
Accuracy
Ambiguities, Anomalies & Omissions in Declarations
   Consultation 
       through 
correspondence
Consultation 
 at National 
  Authorities
Clarification  
     Visits
Declared 
Facilties
     Facilties that  
should have been 
        declared
Accurate and Complete Declarations
Measures to Ensure Submission of Declarations
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33.   These are provisions which first appeared in the draft Protocol in July 1999 and reflect
the difficulties that the CWC has encountered in receiving declarations that were complete or
on time.   The report29 on the implementation of the CWC for the year 1 January to 31
December 1998 noted that thirty-five of 121 States Parties had still not submitted initial
declarations by 31 December  [1998].  A tabulation shows how many of the 121 States
Parties had made initial declarations and other obligatory notifications:
Initial declaration or obligatory notification Received by 31 December 1998
from States Parties
Initial declaration 86
National Authority 85
Point of entry for inspection teams 65
Standing diplomatic clearance number 53
Implementing legislation 40
Detailed information by State Party is provided in Annex 4 of the OPCW report.
34.   The provisions in the Protocol require the Director-General as soon as possible after the
deadline for the submission of initial or annual declarations has passed to issue a written
request to States Parties which have not submitted all their declarations and that the Director-
General shall report to each session of the Conference of States Parties on the implementation
of the declaration obligations.   In addition, currently within square brackets, should a State
Party not submit its initial or annual declarations within  the [6] month period following the
relevant deadline, then one or more of the following measures may be applied:
(a)  The State Party shall have no vote in the Conference of States Parties;
(b)  The State Party shall not be eligible for election as a member of the Executive
Council or, if already a member of the Executive Council, shall be suspended from
membership of the Executive Council;
(c)  The State party may not invoke the declaration clarification procedure...or a
facility investigation;
(d)   The State party may not request the Technical [Secretariat][Body] for technical
assistance under Article VII other than assistance in the preparation of declarations;
(e)   The State party may not have access to the declarations of other States Parties;
(f)   The State Party may not invoke those provisions on consultation, clarification
and cooperation...;
Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
                                                
29Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report of the Organisation on the Implementation of
the Convention (1 January - 31 December 1998), Conference of States Parties, Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July
1999, C-IV/5, 2 July 1999.
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35.   These are provisions to enable States Parties to consult and cooperate on any matter
which may be raised relating to the object and purpose of the Convention, or the
implementation of the provisions of this Protocol and to clarify and resolve any matter which
may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the [basic] obligations of this
Protocol or the Convention.   It sets out a number of procedures for seeking clarification
which States Parties may follow prior to the submission of any request for an investigation.
Investigations, both Field and Facility
36.   The Protocol contains detailed procedures for the initiation and carrying out of
investigations:
[(a) Investigations to be carried out in geographic areas where the [release of, or]
exposure of humans, animals or plants to microbial or other agents and/or toxins has
given rise to a concern about a possible [non-compliance under Article I of the
Convention][use of biological weapons], hereinafter referred to as "Field
investigations".]
(b)   Investigations of alleged breaches of obligations under Article I of the
Convention, to be conducted inside the perimeter of a particular facility(ies) at which
there is a substantiated concern that it is involved in activities prohibited by Article I
of the Convention, hereinafter referred to as "facility investigations".
Article VII Measures to Promote Technical Cooperation
37.   A number of measures are being elaborated in the Protocol with the aim of achieving the
full and effective implementation of Article X of the Convention.  Briefing Paper No 2230
considered the extent to which such activities would be appropriate and well suited to the
future BTWC Organization as well as the contributions that they would make to building
confidence in compliance and to promoting universal accession to the Protocol.   Briefing
Paper No 22 concluded that it is already clear from the existing text of Article VII that the
Protocol has moved well beyond what is in the CWC and consequently that the Protocol
should already contain elements that will help to promote its universality to all States.
The Overall BTWC Protocol Regime
38.   The overall regime can be shown schematically as follows in which the contribution that
Article X measures can make to both increasing transparency and to building confidence as
well as to providing information that can help to resolve inconsistencies, ambiguities and
anomalies is included:
                                                
30Graham S Pearson, Article VII Measures:  Optimizing the Benefits, Briefing Paper No. 22, University of
Bradford, July 1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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Comparative Evaluation
39.  The  CWC and the BTWC Protocol regimes can now be evaluated against the criteria:
Increased transparency
Enhanced confidence in compliance
Applicability (to all relevant facilities and activities)
Acceptability (burden, avoidance of negative impact, protection of CPI and national 
security needs)
Reliability
Cost-effectiveness
Potential for abuse
Promotion of universality
Deterrence of non-compliance
This evaluation is made, first for the CWC regime and then for the BTWC Protocol regime,
in the following tables.    As an illustration of the evaluation process, mandatory declarations
under the CWC are assessed as having provided increased transparency and have also
enhanced confidence in compliance.   Their applicability is, however, limited to those
facilities that are required to be declared.  Their acceptability is seen as moderate as some
declarations are classified as containing CPI and a significant number of declarations are
needed -- several hundred -- for a developed country in contrast to the 10s of declarations
envisaged for the BTWC Protocol.    Their reliability is assessed as poor as the OPCW
experience has shown that a number of States Parties have been distinctly dilatory in
submitting their declarations.  The cost effectiveness is assessed as moderate because of the
number of declarations and the need to ensure protection of the information within the
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declarations.  The potential for abuse is seen as moderate as the mandatory declarations for
the OPCW in isolation  have no elaborated declarations follow-up or declaration clarification
procedures.   Likewise the deterrence of non-compliance through declarations in isolation  is
seen as moderate.   Finally the promotion of universality is seen as low primarily because of
the burden associated with the large numbers of declarations and the detailed information
required which has been judged as requiring protection.
40.    The comparable evaluation for mandatory declarations in the BTWC Protocol regime is
broadly similar.  They also are assessed as providing increased transparency and to increasing
confidence in compliance.   Their applicability is likewise limited to those facilities which
will require to be declared.   Their acceptability is seen as high as no CPI will be required and
their number is modest -- of the order of 10s in a developed country.   Their reliability is
assessed in isolation as poor, based on the BTWC CBM experience, to good as their
reliability has the potential to increase both through the declaration follow-up procedures and
through the measures to ensure that declarations are submitted.   Their cost-effectiveness is
seen as high as the numbers required are significantly less than for the CWC, no CPI is
required and the burden is consequently significantly less although the benefit to the regime is
high as the most relevant facilities will be declared.    The potential for abuse is seen as
moderate as the number of facilities requiring to be declared will be small -- tens of facilities
per country -- and consequently other relevant facilities will not be declared.  Likewise the
deterrence of non-compliance through declarations in isolation  is seen as moderate.   Finally
the promotion of universality is seen in isolation  as low to moderate primarily because of the
burden associated with the provision of declarations.
41.   A similar process is applied to arrive at the other evaluations shown in Table 4.
Table 4:  Overall Evaluation of CWC and of BTWC Protocol Regimes
CWC
Regime
Measu
re
Increased
Transparen
cy
Enhanced
Confidence
in
Compliance
Applicabi
lity
Acceptabi
lity
Reliabili
ty
Cost-
effectiv
eness
Potential
for abuse
Deterrenc
e of non-
complianc
e
Promotio
n of
Protocol
universali
ty
Mandat
ory
declarat
ions
Yes Yes
To
facili
ties
to be
decla
red
Moderat
e
Poor
(OPC
W
experi
ence)
Moder
ate
Moderate Moderat
e
Low
Routine
inspecti
ons
Limited
increase -
in
particular
areas
Limited
improvemen
t - in
particular
areas
To
partic
ular
areas
decla
red
High
(Facility
Agreem
ent)
Good
in
particu
lar
areas
Moder
ate
Low Good in
particul
ar areas
Low
Challen
ge
inspecti
ons
Yes - in
area
inspected
Yes Very
broad
Yes
Moder
ate -
depend
s on
initiati
on
Good Low* High Low
CWC
Article
XI
Econo
mic &
Techno
logical
Develo
pt
Low
(few
activities)
Low
(few
activities)
Poten
tially
broad
Yes Low Moder
ate
Low Low Moderat
e
* Potential for abuse is assessed as low because the intitiation of a challenge inspection will be highly political and the provisions
for
dealing with abuse are severe.
BTWC
Protoc
ol
Regime
Measu
re
Increased
Transparen
cy
Enhanced
Confidence
in Compliance
Applic
ability
Acceptabi
lity
Reliabili
ty
Cost-
effectiv
eness
Potential
for abuse
Deterrenc
e of non-
complianc
e
Promotio
n of
Protocol
universali
ty
Mandat
ory
declarat
ions
Yes Yes To
facili
ties
to be
decla
red
High
(No CPI
required
)
Poor
to
Good
(CBM
experi
ence)
High
(better
than
CWC
as
fewer
reqd)
Moderate Moderat
e
Low to
Moderat
e
Declara
tion
follow-
up
procedu
res
-
random
ly-
selected
visits
Increased Increased To
facili
ties
to be
decla
red
High High
(impro
ves
quality
of
declara
tions)
High
(infreq
uent
visits)
Low Good
Moderat
e
(through
technica
l
assistan
ce
extensio
ns)
-
declarat
ion
clarific
ation
procedu
res
Increased Increased
Broa
der
(to
facili
ties
that
shoul
d be
decla
red)
High
High
(impro
ves
quality
of
declara
tions)
High
(Reduc
es over
time)
Low Good
Moderat
e
(ensures
equal
obligati
ons)
-
volunta
ry visits
Possible Possible Some Yes Low Moder
ate
Moderate Low
Moderat
e
(for
assistan
ce)
Measur
es to
ensure
submis
sion of
declarat
ions
Increased Increased Yes Yes Depen
ds on
politic
al will
High Low Good
Moderat
e
(ensures
equal
obligati
ons)
Investig
ations
Yes - in
area
inspected
Yes Very
broad
Yes
Moder
ate -
depend
s on
initiati
on
Good Low* High Low
Article
VII
Measur
es
Moderate
(more
activities)
Moderate
(more
activities)
Poten
tially
broad
Yes Low Moder
ate
Low Moderat
e
High
(concret
e
measure
s)
• Potential for abuse is assessed as low because the intitiation of an investigation will be
• highly political and the provisions for
dealing with abuse are severe.
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Conclusions
42.   As might be expected, there are indeed similarities and differences between the CWC
and the BTWC Protocol regimes.   Both the CWC and the BTWC Protocol regimes are
addressing the dual-use nature of the technology and both are addressing prohibitions which
are based on general purpose criteria -- in the BTWC Protocol regime this is the prohibition
in Article I of the BTWC:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1)  Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
43.   The CWC regime was finalised in the late 1980s whilst the BTWC Protocol regimes is
currently being finalised -- and has benefitted from the experience gained by the OPCW and
by States Parties in the implementation of the CWC as well as the other international
developments during the past decade.     Thus the BTWC Protocol regime has been tailored --
and rightly so -- to deal with the particular problems associated with compliance of the
BTWC which includes the necessity to cope with a situation in which smaller quantities of
agent and smaller facilities could be used in a non-compliant activity.   However, the
experience gained from compliance and verification regimes over the past decade has made it
clear that one of the strongest tools in assessing compliance is the consistency of the
information that becomes available from many sources.  In a world in which more and more
information is being provided on official as well as unofficial websites, it is becoming harder
and harder to be confident that proscribed activities can be hidden in such a way that no
inconsistencies are evident.    In terms of the jigsaw analogy, there is no requirement to have
all the pieces of the jigsaw to be confident of compliance so long as all the pieces are
clearly from the same picture.   It is for this reason that it is vital that the BTWC Protocol
regime is a three pillar regime31 with declarations of which the completeness and accuracy are
ensured through declaration follow-up procedures and declaration clarification procedures,
infrequent visits as part of these declaration follow-up procedures as well as to implement
Protocol Article VII measures, and both field and facility investigations.
44.   The BTWC Protocol regime can thus be considered in the round and compared with the
CWC regime.   The Protocol declarations will be considerably less onerous than those for the
CWC as only tens of facilities will need to be developed in a typical developed country such
as those in Europe.   No CPI information will be required yet the facilities to be declared will
be selected to be those of particular relevance.    The provisions for ensuring the submission
of declarations have no parallel in the CWC regime and should be effective in ensuring that
States Parties to the Protocol comply with their obligations.   The declaration follow-up
procedures with infrequent randomly-selected/transparency visits will ensure that declarations
are accurate with the potential for extension of such visits to provide advice and technical
                                                
31Douglas J MacEachin, Routine and Challenge:  Two Pillars of Verification, The CBW Conventions Bulletin,
Issue No 39, March 1998, pp.1 - 3.
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cooperation providing a useful bonus for States Parties.   The declaration clarification
procedures, ranging from written correspondence through a consultative meeting to, if
necessary, a clarification visit, will ensure that declarations are complete and accurate.   Both
of these are developments from the CWC regime and should ensure that the Protocol regime
is more reliable.   Investigations are always going to be highly political in nature and
consequently extremely rare events.   They are, however, vital elements of the overall regime.
The specific Protocol provisions for implementation of Article X of the BTWC go far beyond
the comparable provisions in the CWC -- and will contribute both to the promotion of
universality of the Protocol and to the increasing of transparency and the building of
confidence in compliance.
45.   All in all, the BTWC Protocol is being crafted so that it will achieve the requirement for
an effective and reliable regime which, in accordance with the AHG mandate, will strengthen
the effectiveness and improve the implementation  of the BTWC and thereby strengthen the
norm against biological weapons.
